The inaugural address of the new professor at Edinburgh will naturally attract much attention in philosophical circles. It is, of course, mainly concerned with Logic, Psychology, and Metaphysics; but it is rendered interesting to students of Ethics by the concluding paragraphs, in which Professor Seth indicates his own stand-point. This stand-point, it is perhaps needless to say, is frankly teleological. He sums it up in the following eloquent passage,-" Not to man as a creature specially located on this earth, but to man and all creatures like him who are sharers in the life of thought, and called thereby to be authors of their own perfection-to man as rational all things are relative. To him the creation looks; for him all things are made. This is the imperishable grandeur of Hegel's system that he has given such sonorous utterance to this view, and expressed it with such magnificent confidence. I cannot always emulate his confidence, nor can I adopt as perfectly satisfactory his universalistic mode of expression. The achievements of the world-spirit do not move me to unqualified admiration, and I cannot accept the abstraction of the race in place of the living children of men. Even if the enormous spiral of human history is destined to wind itself at last to a point which may be called achievement, what, I ask, of the multitudes who perished by the way? These all died, not having received the promises. What if there are no promises to them ? To me the old idea of the world as the training-ground of individual character seems to offer a much more human, and, I will add, a much more divine, solution than this pitiless procession of the car of progress. Happily, however, the one view does not necessarily exclude the other; we may believe in the progress of the race and yet believe in the future of the individual. Nature's profusion and nature's work will doubtless be urged against us when we plead for the rights of the individual life. But these are objections which every theodicy has to meet. I do not wish to minimize them; on the contrary, they appeal to me with painful force. But the possibility of any theodicy depends on our being able to show that nature and nature's ways of working are not the last word of creation. Nature is non-moral, indifferent, and pitiless; but man is pitiful, and human nature flowers in love and self-denial, in purity and stainless honor. If these have no root in the nature of things, then, indeed, ' The pillared firmament is rottenness, And earth's base built on stubble '
But we do well, as Goethe teaches in one of his finest poems, to recognize in such attributes of human-kind our nearest glimpse into the nature of the divine. The part is not greater than the whole; and we may rest assured that whatever This content downloaded from 052.011.211.149 on October 03, 2019 03:39:55 AM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-a of wisdom and goodness there is in us was not born out of nothing, but has its fount somewhere and somehow in a more perfect goodness and truth."
With much of the spirit of this " sonorous utterance" the present reviewer is in hearty sympathy, though the expression of it is necessarily somewhat popular, and might be objected to from a strictly philosophical point of view. It puts several points in an imaginative rather than in a rational form. Of this, however, I do not wish to complain. But I cannot quite agree with the implied slight on Hegel and the world-spirit. It is, no doubt, interesting to learn that Professor Seth has not an " unqualified admiration" for the achievements of either of them. Neither have 1. I trust philosophy did not end with 'Hegel, and I trust the world-spirit has not come to a stand. But we are all sons of the world-spirit, and some of us are suns of Hegel; and we do not like to be told that our father accepted " the abstraction of the race in place of the living children of men," and believed in -a " pitiless procession of the car of progress." Who wrote the following? " The term subjectivity is not to be confined merely to the bad and finite kind of it which is contradistinguished from the fact. In its truth subjectivity is immanent in the fact, and as a subjectivity thus immanent is the very truth of the fact. Thus regarded, the doctrine of consolation receives a newer and a higher significance. It is in this sense that the Christian religion is to be regarded as the religion of consolation, and even of absolute consolation. Christianity, we know, teaches that God wishes all men to be saved. That teaching declares that subjectivity has an infinite value. And that consoling power of Christianity just lies in the fact that God himself is in it known as the absolute subjectivity, so that, inasmuch as subjectivity involves the element of particularity, our particular and personal part too is recognized, not merely as something to be solely and simply denied, but at the same time something to be preserved." It was Hegel who said this.* He and the world-spirit have happily left us something still to do. So have Shakespeare and Goethe, Newton and Darwin; and even if Professor Seth " cannot always emulate" them, or feel " unqualified admiration" towards them, it may still be worth while to try to learn something from their " utterances," "s sonorous" and other. Even a superior person who does not entirely believe either in Hegel or in history, may find on further study that Hegel and history were not so entirely wrong as he imagined.
